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MENTAL CRUELTY: THE JUDGE IN SEARCH
OF A PRECEPT
The mind is its own place, and in itself can make a heaven of hell,
a hell of heaven.
John Milton, Paradise Lost,
Book I, line 253.
JAMES 0. MONROE, JR.*
OLEMNLY, soberly, sincerely, and quite seriously-almost as if it
could be done-the Illinois trial judges undertook to define
"mental cruelty." The occasion was the annual Judges' Seminar
of the Illinois Judicial Conference, which took place in Chicago in
September, 1968. As directed by the highest law of the state, the Illi-
nois Constitution, the Conference had been convened by the Illinois
Supreme Court. The topic was assigned, and the judges were ordered
to attend because, just a year before, the Governor had signed into law
an additional three words to the statute authorizing divorce for ex-
treme and repeated cruelty. The three words added were "physical or
mental."' Since 1874 the cruelty statute was construed as applying
only to extreme and repeated physical cruelty. 2 Now it said "extreme
and repeated physical or mental cruelty." What does that mean?
How should the new statute be construed? The trial judges were now
being told to think about it.
A 1965 law review article seemed to invite the addition of mental
cruelty as a ground for divorce.3  Comments subsequent to the new
statute seemed to welcome the addition-at least it was not viewed
with alarm. In attempts to interpret "mental cruelty," these comments
on the new statute relied on the following theories: the Illinois separate
* JUDGE MONROE is a Circuit Judge in the Third Judicial Circuit, Edwardsville,
Illinois.
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1 (1967).
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1 (1965).
3. Schiller, Domestic Relations-A Survey of Mental Cruelty As a Ground for
Divorce, 15 DEPAUL L. REV. 159 (1965).
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maintenance analogies;4 the mental cruelty cases of other jurisdic-
tions; 5 some pleading matters;' and one divorce judge's rule of thumb. 7
All of these materials may be helpful, perhaps dispositive, in the typical
case, whether default or contested. But if they are taken as categorical
imperatives, they may serve to obscure the subtleties of the marriage
relationship and impede the imaginative and just solution of the
equally subtle problems of ensuing divorce cases. If the stereotypes
they suggest become rules without exceptions, they may even be mis-
leading, illusory and deceptive.
In this paper, by contrast, there are no absolutes in the form of
rules or dispositions, no law as it is or should be, but instead the
possibilities of what it may or might be. It thus offers a basis not for
decisions as much as for the state of mind in which to make them.
Though some obvious results are indicated, the emphasis is on the
approach, the attitude and the process of decision-making. Reflecting
the search of a trial judge, it may be taken as a practical and personal
study in jurisprudence, containing some items beyond those ordinarily
found in law briefs and court opinions.
EXPLORATION-WHAT IS MENTAL CRUELTY?
8
The question posed by this section title was and is highly current.
The new statute is not yet interpreted, and until some broad defini-
tive expressions have come from the Illinois Supreme Court, the case
law is likely to develop slowly-by single instances said to be or not
to be mental cruelty, and with possible variances among several dis-
tricts of the appellate court.
The question is highly urgent. Cases have been coming into the
trial courts for more than a year throughout the state, with decisions
4. Bundesen, Mental Cruelty-What Does It Mean? 49 Cm. BAR REC. 234
(1968). See also Bundesen, Mental Cruelty-A Look at the Future 56 ILL. B.
J. 10 (1967).
5. Gitlin, Mental Cruelty: A Look to the Past, 57 ILL.B.J. 136 (1968).
6. Rosenberg, Notes on New Mental Cruelty Grounds in Illinois, 18 DECALOGUE J.
16 (1967).
7. Harrod, Mental Cruelty: Observations from the Bench, 57 ILL.B.J. 142
(1968).
8. The unorthodox aspects of this section are best explained as an attempt to
present the reader with the dilemmas and problems of a trial judge, who is handed
cases with more pressures than precedents, with briefs (if any) of varying
quality and extent, and with little real guidance except his own background.
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at hand in both default and contested matters. They cannot be
deferred. The urgency is compounded by the fact that divorce
suits constitute one of the largest and most significant categories of
cases in the state trial courts.
The question is highly practical. It involves incidents in the most
important relationship in life-incidents which may be utilized as a
key to freedom from unbearable situations if accepted as grounds for
divorce and which must be suffered without relief if not accepted as
grounds.
The question is delicate. In most marriages there are seldom really
any incidents permitting divorce under traditional Illinois grounds.
Impotence, bigamy, venereal disease communicated, attempt to kill,
and felony are so rare that they are considered bizarre. Adultery is
probably far less prevalent than indicated in the novels and movies
which we may enjoy but do not follow. Drunkenness is not often
habitual for more than two years. Except in rare cases, a man's
physical pain from a spouse's blow is less than he would shake off in
a football game, a woman's less than she would cherish in childbirth;
and most such "physical cruelty" is actually provoked. Separations
are brief, agreed, childish or splenetic; few separations, if justified
in the first place, last a year. In short, Illinois has not been a "divorce
state."
But now, suddenly, there is a new ground, or an old ground newly
expanded. Will items heretofore not quite grounds now become
part of mental cruelty? Will the items heretofore insufficient-
desertion less than a year, drunkenness less than two years, physical
cruelty not quite extreme or repeated, philandering short of adultery-
will they become ingredients of mental cruelty? What about items
differing from the traditional grounds not only in degree but in
kind? For example: irritation; yelling; nagging; sulking; cursing;
spending the paycheck; calling the boss; embarassing the bridge club;
playing poker all night; going home to mother; rings around the
bathtub; dirty feet; that television; that radio; that golf; that guy;
that kid; all the "Excedrin headaches." Will these now become evi-
dence in divorce cases?
Before we consider the new ground, though, the present status
should be examined. Illinois may not be a "divorce state," but di-
vorce in Illinois is acceptable and accepted. In the mid-fifties, our
[Vol. XIX:52
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governor, our senior senator, and our former governor, were all di-
vorced. As in most other states, our "rate" was one divorce for
about three marriages.9
How is this possible if we are not in a "divorce state?" How is
it possible when there are seldom really any incidents permitting di-
vorce under traditional Illinois grounds? Very simply, the parties
wait out the separation for a year and say it was not by agreement,
or they stretch some other traditional ground into a clean and non-
perjurious set of terse answers to adroit questions which would not
stand up sixty seconds under penetrating cross-examination.10 But
the court does not cross examine, and lawyers and judges, even of
the faiths most vocally opposed to divorce, have agreed they should
not. Without "divorce by agreement"" many divorces could not be
granted at all.
Still there is a bad taste about such practice. The parties leave
court sadder if more free, as if a great weight were gone, but wishing
that the trip had not been necessary. They know the testimony was
half-truth. So do the lawyers. So does the staff. So do the judges.
And it was disturbing. How can we think straight about law and
order if the law is bent or twisted in our most personal concerns?
One explanation concerning the desirability of the new statute
bears precisely on this question. It contends that, heretofore, the
practice has involved not only half-truth, but also perjury, and that
the purpose of the new statute was simply to remove perjury from
Illinois divorces. 2 Whatever the rationale, here was the new statute,
the new phrase "mental cruelty" and the crucial question: What
does it mean? The judges in conference were indeed faced with a
difficult question.
One judge suggested that mental cruelty is a course of conduct,
carried out by the one spouse against the other, in connection with
the marriage, which need not cause physical harm but which renders
life miserable and unendurable or unbearable and makes it impossible
9. Data presented at the 1968 Judges Seminar included: national average, I
divorce for every 2.5 marriages; last year in Cook County, 43 divorce decrees for
every 100 marriage licenses; and in Phoenix, 100 divorce decrees for every 100
marriage licenses.
10. See Bundesen, supra note 4, at 235, and Schiller, supra note 3, at 163.
11. See Schiller, supra note 3, at 163.
12. See Bundesen, supra note 4, at 235, and Schiller, supra note 3, at 163.
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to continue the marriage. This definition was termed the course
of conduct concept. There was similar language in the advance read-
ing materials, in the separate maintenance cases,'" in the first pub-
lished comments,"4 and also in the first complaints. 15 The trouble
with this definition is that the language is not sufficiently specific.
What kind of conduct must be alleged and proved-action, words,
gestures, contact? The failure or refusal to do what an ordinary,
reasonable and prudent married person would do, or the doing of
something an ordinary, reasonable and prudent married person would
not do? Why must it be a course of conduct? Two acts make out
repeated physical cruelty.' 6 Why not two acts of extreme mental
cruelty? "In connection with the marriage," someone asked, "does
that mean rising out of and in the course of?" What proof shows
a person is miserable-the person's own opinion; or must she at
least go to bed or take an aspirin; must he escape to the office, or
take to drink? Is the definition too vague?
Another judge suggested that mental cruelty involves fault-at
least some concept of duty, breach and injury. The defendant must
violate some duty, in some way affecting the marriage, with some
substantial harm to the spouse. The defendant's conduct could be
action or omission; to be grounds it ought to be intentional or wilful,
or wanton, or at least negligent-unless we have marriage liability
without fault. It ought to be causally connected to the harm claimed.
The harm ought to be substantial-some observable condition, ail-
ment, or reaction of physical, mental, psychic or emotional conse-
quence. Thus we have a tort concept.'7  But this definition is too
restrictive as the other is too loose. There must be thousands of
things a person could do freely if living alone, but which would be
offensive to a spouse and which the law ought not permit to the
detriment of the complaining spouse and the disruption of the mar-
13. Johnson v. Johnson, 125 Ill. 510, 16 N.E.2d 366 (1888); French v. French,
302 Ill. 152, 134 N.E. 33 (1922).
14. Bundesen, supra note 4; Harrod, supra note 7; Gitlin, supra note 5; and
Rosenberg, supra note 6.
15. Holland v. Holland, 67-D-752 (Madison Co. 1967) and McKean v.
McKean, 67-D-824, (Madison Co. 1967). In each case, the complaint was with-
drawn with leave, more evidence secured, and a decree granted later.
16. Collinet v. Collinet, 31111. App. 2d 72, 77, 175 N.E.2d 659, 662 (1961).
17. See Johnson v. Johnson, supra note 13; Henderson v. Henderson, 88 111.
248 (1878); and Levy v. Levy, 388 111. 179, 57 N.E.2d 462 (1944).
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riage. The conduct of the defendant which constitutes mental
cruelty need not be a crime or a breach of the peace. It need not
be conduct which would be a tort between strangers. If fault were
to be construed as tortious fault, there may indeed be liability without
such fault.
If a person builds a reservoir or brings dynamite on his land, and
the reservoir leaks or the dynamite explodes causing damage to
neighboring property, even though that person was without fault
and had used the highest care possible, he may be held liable to the
damaged neighbor. Suppose instead of bringing deep water or
dynamite onto land, a person brings into the marriage scene a philan-
derer, or boorish friends, or domineering in-laws, or vicious personal
habits, and this causes damage to the marriage. Should not that
person be likewise held liable to the damaged spouse? Is one's duty
not to cause harm through use of inherently dangerous items greater
toward a neighbor than toward a wife or husband? Is a neighbor's
right to property free from harm greater than a spouse's right to a
marriage free from harm? Does the law protect one and not the
other, or one more than the other? On the other hand, philanderers,
drinking buddies, in-laws and bad manner may be uncouth or even
immoral, but evoking them is not usually thought to be a crime or
even a tort. Is it wrong at all?
With these arguments in mind, it was offered that: "Mental
cruelty obviously includes conduct which is neither a crime nor a
tort." Examples support this view:
1) H is a classical concert pianist, married to W, a former student of his at
Juilliard. She suddenly takes to rock and roll music and plays such records several
hours a day. Avoiding the din, H works so hard at the studio he becomes the great-
est performer of the decade. But his home is intolerable.
2) W, an English teacher, wins national standing with her view, in articles and on
television, that obscenity is best met not by ineffective banning but by supplanting
it with reading and movies of good taste. Her husband H becomes addicted to por-
nography, takes up with hippies, and writes four-letter words on the apartment walls.
3) W, wife of a conservative Episcopalian priest, starts visiting different churches
to see how "God's other children" live, and winds up holding "holy roller" meetings
in the parsonage parlor.
These examples present a relative conduct concept.'8 In each
18. See Mason v. Mason, 342 Ill. App. 140, 95 N.E.2d 522 (1950); Garvy v.
Garvy, 282 I1. App. 485 (1935).
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case, the offending spouse has done no legal wrong. 9 Does the other
spouse have to put up with such conduct? Is a married person not
entitled to his own way of life, free from jarring and obnoxious con-
flicts? In the marriage relation, if we expect "love and affection,"
can we not have at least consideration? On the other hand, if you
marry a farmer, don't you have to expect manure tramped into the
kitchen? Is a person inherently tied to the rules of his spouse's
social set? What about mutuality? Who is putting up with whom?
Whose taste prevails? In case 3, if W loves H, why should not she
remain in the church; but if H loves W, and if he is a good Christian,
why should not he tolerate her change? De gustibus non disputandi.
The question is not whether one spouse has an abstract legal right to
act contrary to the other's tastes, but whether it is mental cruelty to
do so. Must one spouse accept the idiosyncracies of the other, long
standing or new? Can one spouse get tired of the marriage? How
long must patience last? Is a married person estopped against
change? If change is permitted, must it always be progress? Or
could it be backward, or simply sidewise and personal? Who is to
say which is which?20
19. In case 1 above, the offending spouse has actually caused material benefit to
the spouse offended-who, like Puccini, has been driven to fame. Success has been
attributed to "a little talent, a lot of work, an inferiority complex, and a wife that
nags."
20. While these hypothetical situations may appear to be contrived, in ac-
tuality they are very realistic. Consider the following examples, which, although
compressed, epitomized, sharpened and paraphrased, are but a small sampling of
cases currently heard in one Illinois trial court. These examples are taken from a
memo of the court, prepared by this writer, in v. , 68-D-27 (Circuit
Court of Madison Co. 1969):
"He ate so fast he belched at the table. He even passed gas. And he came to the
table in filthy underwear. He bathed only once or twice a week and he never
brushed his teeth. He went to bed dirty and pawed around with dirty hands-he
even got me infected. He would go a long time without any love, then he'd want to
make love all of a sudden. He would come to bed doused with cologne, but between
the body odor and the bad breath I couldn't stand him. He was rude to guests and
only went to church when he thought it would help him out. He wouldn't take
care of the yard. He was terrible about the children. He let the kids hitchhike and
play on the lake, burn rags, blow money, stay out after midnight and play with
knives. I couldn't sleep, or think, or reach him. I lost weight, and went to the
doctor. I took equinal tranquilizers. Since he's gone, the strain is gone. I don't
need any tranquilizers." v. , 68-D-323 (Madison Co. 1969).
"We had her mother and her sister. I had the house refinanced twice to buy
cars for her mother, and the mother borrowed $2,000 to have cash for her re-
tirement-I signed the note each time. I asked her not to have her sister in the
home, but she brought the sister in, and she refused to keep house unless I paid
her. . . . She never fixed breakfast. There was no lunch on school days. She
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BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
With a statute recently passed and not yet interpreted, what
leads are there? In Illinois, there is a long background and a sizeable
group of analogous cases.
From 1845 to 1874, divorce could be granted in Illinois for certain
named grounds and for unspecified grounds.2 Conceivably, the
unspecified grounds might have included mental cruelty. The
broad provision for unspecified grounds was deleted, however, in the
1874 statute; the specified grounds were the only grounds permitted.
The only cruelty constituting a ground for divorce was physical
cruelty, and this was strictly construed. It had to be grave, extreme,
endangering, or subjecting the spouse to great bodily harm. It had
to be repeated. It did not include "harsh language," or "mental
suffering"--i.e., mental cruelty.22
Such "mental cruelty," although insufficient to obtain a divorce,
was nevertheless sufficient to obtain separate maintenance-relief
for a spouse living "separate and apart without fault." Conduct
may not be such "extreme and repeated physical cruelty" as to war-
rant divorce, and yet make life with the offender miserable and un-
endurable. In such a case, the offended one may move out of the
house with impunity, and live separate and apart without fault,
warranting separate maintenance. The offender, having caused
the breach, could not successfully claim abandonment or desertion
as ground for or defense against separate maintenance.
cooked everything in one pot or pan four or five days out of the week.
"We had sexual intercourse about nine times in the last five years. She said:
'Leave me alone. I don't feel like it. I don't want to. I want to lay in bed and
read.'" v. , 68-D-864 (Madison Co. 1969).
These actual cases may show that truth is not only often as strange, but also as
cruel as fiction. But they may not fully dramatize the elements of character and
sensibility involved in these things. For these, we can perhaps learn a great deal
from drama and literature. Consider the domestic relations cases from the follow-
ing literary works: SHAW, The Girls in Their Summer Dresses, in SHORT STORIES
FROM THE NEW YORKER 3 (1940); COATES, The Net, id. at 22; LOCKRIDGE, The
Nice Judge Trowbridge, id. at 389; RAWLINGS, The Pelican's Shadow, id. at 291;
SCHORER, Portrait of Ladies, id. at 313; BENSON, Little Woman, id. at 337; MA-
LONEY, A Toast to Captain Jerk, id. at 38; AscH, The Words, id. at 129; MAURIAC,
THERESE DESQUEYROUX (1963).
21. See Henderson v. Henderson, supra note 17.
22. Vignos v. Vignos, 15 Ill. 186 (1853); Henderson v. Henderson, supra note
17; Garvy v. Garvy, supra note 18; Moore v. Moore, 362 Ill. 177, 199 N.E. 98
(1935).
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A wife who is not herself at fault is not bound to live and cohabit with her hus-
band if his conduct is such as to directly endanger her life, person or health, nor
where the husband pursues a persistent, unjustifiable and wrongful course of conduct
toward her, which will necessarily and inevitably render life miserable, and living as
his wife unendurable. Incompatibility of disposition, occasional ebullitions of
passion, trivial difficulties, or slight moral obliquities, will not justify separation.
If the husband voluntarily does that which compels the wife to leave him, or justifies
her in so doing, the inference may be justly drawn that he intended to produce that
result, on the familiar principle that sane men usually mean to produce those
results which naturally and legitimately flow from their actions. And if he so
intended, her leaving him would, in the case put, be desertion on his part, and not
by the wife.2 8
Conversely, if in the varying circumstances of domestic strife it be-
came the offended one who remained in the family home, the one
remaining would be without fault and with a right to separate main-
tenance; the abandoner could neither secure separate maintenance nor
defend against it. 24
The legislature, by adding mental cruelty as a ground for divorce,
indicated that the phrase "mental cruelty" means something differ-
ent from physical cruelty-otherwise the legislative enactment meant
nothing. (It need not have meant something less severe, for mental
pain can be more agonizing than physical.) 25  At least we may
assume that mental cruelty is, in the language of the young, "some-
thing else." What is that something else?
An analogy between separate maintenance grounds and mental
cruelty has been suggested. Thus, consider cruel words expressing
dissatisfaction, scorn and abuse, or threatening to cut off credit and
support, or repeated unjust accusations of infidelity. 20 These fall
short of physical cruelty, and were not thus grounds for divorce.
They are less than or at least different from physical cruelty; but they
may render the abandoned spouse's life unendurable, and hence may
23. Johnson v. Johnson, supra note 13, at 515. The presumption of intent is
accepted even though "no one but a lawyer would say that I must be presumed to
have intended to put my ball in the bunker because that was the natural and
probable result of my shot." Brown, Cruelty without Culpability, 26 MoD. L. REV.
625 (1963).
24. For an instance of recriminatory abandonment, first by the wife, then, on
her return, by the husband, see Garvy v. Garvy, supra note 18.
25. Schiller, supra note 3.
26. See Goldstine v. Goldstine, 23 I11. App. 2d 367, 163 N.E.2d 214 (1959);
French v. French, supra note 13; Cash v. Cash, 180 111. App. 31 (1913); Schriner v.
Schriner, 155 Il. App. 191 (1910); and Schoop v. Schoop, 115 Ill. App. 343 (1904).
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be grounds for separate maintenance.
The analogue logic is simple: cruel words, not being physical
cruelty, are nevertheless cruel: they must be mental cruelty. The
logic, as such, is superficial-a plain non sequitur. There may be
many kinds of cruelty: physical, mental, emotional, social. The
legislature may very well have meant any cruelty not physical to be
included in mental cruelty and thus be a ground for divorce under
that label. But this is a matter of terminology and legislative intent-
not of logic.
To bring other items warranting separate maintenance, items other
than quasi-physical cruelty items, into the area of mental cruelty,
involves not one non sequitur but two. Logically, whatever warrants
separate maintenance by being unendurable is therefore cruelty, and
if it is not physical, it is therefore mental cruelty. But, a separate
maintenance ground may not be "cruelty" at all. It could be deser-
tion,27 or stinginess.28 Many things are unendurable, or unbearable,
without being cruel.
Nevertheless, the analogy between grounds for separate main-
tenance and mental cruelty might indeed have been intended by the
legislature, non sequitur or not. Legislators do not live by Euler's
circles. Metaphysically, there could be six kinds of cruelty-physi-
cal, mental, emotional, social, direct, indirect. However, physical
and mental are the only two kinds of cruelty generally considered in
divorce law-quite likely the only two that occurred to the many
lawyers in the legislature. "Physical" and "mental" cruelty may have
been taken to exhaust and to include all the possibilities.
Thus the separate maintenance cases may be very much in point.
At least they seem more applicable than "other jurisdictions." Of
course the other jurisdictions should be explored. A scanning dis-
closes three broad matters worth noting here: 1) divorce without
fault, possible in certain jurisdictions, especially abroad;2" 2) di-
vorce when both parties are at fault; 0 and 3) divorce by agreement,
which was proposed as currently as December, 1968, not in radical
27. Slaight v. Slaight, 50 111. App. 2d 31, 199 N.E.2d 650 (1964) (leaving
without cause).
28. Harris v. Harris, 109 Il1. App. 148 (1902).
29. See Silving, Divorce Without Fault, 29 IowA L. REV. 527 (1944).
30. See Crummit, Divorce-Equal Fault-Granted to Both Parties, 25 KAN.
STATE BAR J. 209 (1956).
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Russia or Sweden, but in once conservative England."
CATALOGUE OF CONDUCT: A MULTITUDE OF SINS
In determining what is or is not mental cruelty in Illinois, trial
court judges will probably have to pass on at least three classes of
cases: 1) cases involving other statutory grounds for divorce,
couched as mental cruelty; 2) similar cases, falling short of other
statutory grounds; and 3) miscellaneous cases.
OTHER STATUTORY GROUNDS
Cases involving other statutory grounds for divorce, it has been
suggested, could and should be considered mental cruelty. 2 Those
acts or conditions have been considered so offensive to the legislature
that they were made express and independent grounds for divorce.
An act so offensive to the legislature not personally involved must
surely be so offensive to the directly affected spouse as to constitute
mental cruelty to that person. Thus mental cruelty might be shown
by allegations and proof3 of the following conduct or conditions:84
31. Saint Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 18, 1968 reported that: Baroness Summer-
skill, a former Labor Party health minister, planned to lead the fight against a British
divorce reform bill in the House of Lords. Divorce could be granted under the bill
if the parties were apart for two years, have no intention of living together again,
and both consent to divorce; or if they were apart for five years, and only one re-
quested divorce--even though the other opposed it. Lady Summerskill called the
bill "a Casanova's charter" by which a man could abandon his wife and children
every five years and marry a younger woman. Sponsors of the bill said financial
arrangements for the first wife and family would be required in such cases. They
justified the bill as enabling some 100,000 men with extra-marital families but legal
wives who refused divorce, to get divorces, legalize their irregular unions and legiti-
mize children. "Irreconcilable differences which have caused the irremediable
breakdown of the marriage" is now a ground for divorce in California. Family Law
Act, West's Calif. Legis. Serv., No. 7, par. 4506, at 3108 (Supp. 1969). A bill
which has been passed by the Italian Chamber of Deputies, but must still go to their
Senate for approval, would allow divorce for five years of actual separation. The
Chicago Tribune, Nov. 29, 1969, § I, at i, col. I.
32. See Harrod, supra note 7.
33. This view may never be tested. If facts showing a separate statutory
ground are presented in a plain and concise statement of the cause of action, as re-
quired by the CIVIL PRACTICE ACT, then words characterizing the facts as a form of
mental cruelty may be regarded as surplusage. If the separate statutory ground
is the essence of the charge, e.g., conviction of felony with a penitentiary sentence,
constituting no loss but "good riddance" for the plaintiff who may in fact even be
glad the defendant is gone, the surplusage may be ignored or even stricken. On
the other hand, if the essence of the matter is the mental cruelty effect, e.g., a
woman slapped twice without permanent or serious physical harm but emotionally
crushed and broken-hearted, the mental cruelty effect may be pointed up, and the
pleading could even be amended to this end.
34. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1 (1967).
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impotence; bigamy; adultery; desertion, actual or constructive, for
more than one year; habitual drunkenness or drug addiction for more
than two years; attempt to kill the spouse by malicious means; extreme
and repeated physical cruelty; conviction of felony or infamous crime;
communicable venereal disease, infecting spouse.
Cases involving actual statutory grounds, couched nevertheless as
mental cruelty, may become increasingly the vogue in Illinois,"
for several reasons. In this form, with general allegations and the
only proof hidden in a court reporter's notebook or a singlecopy
transcript, still-loving children and nosey neighbors may never know
the nasty truth-and why should they? In this form, the press may
carry and the public learn only vague generalities-scandal may be
avoided. In those cases where it would seem that the real offender,
instead of being punished, is actually gaining his freedom, the of-
fense by which freedom is gained may seem less heinous and the
irony less perturbing. Any implicit invitation to misconduct may be
less apparent.
SIMILAR CASES, SHORT OF STATUTORY GROUNDS
Cases involving conduct or conditions similar to statutory grounds,
but falling short of those express and exacting causes, may or may not
be mental cruelty. They have not all been covered in Illinois separate
maintenance cases, but they afford a useful catalogue of marital mis-
conduct or conditions, and may have to be considered eventually.
Conditions or Conduct Similar to Impotence
Of all the heretofore standard Illinois statutory grounds for divorce,
only one-impotence, permitted divorce for only a condition. The
ground was some organic or physical disability precluding or render-
ing inadequate any sexual relation between the spouses.A6  This
ground could be proved without any intent or act of the offending
spouse even though the offending spouse might fervently wish it other-
wise.37 It was an admittedly tragic situation for which the offending
35. See Bundesen, supra note 4, at 237. Cf. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 16, 17;
and Gitlin, supra note 5, at 140.
36. Lorenz v. Lorenz, 93 Ill. 376 (1879).
37. See Reighley v. Continental 11. Nat'l Bank, 323 Il. App. 479, 56 N.E.2d 328
(1944) and Kinkaid v. Kinkaid, 256 Ill. 548, 100 N.E. 217 (1912).
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spouse need not be blamed, but from which the other person was set
free. Oddly enough, actual conduct causing temporary impotence,
such as drinking oneself into a stupor for days or weeks, and thus be-
coming not organically but factually impotent, i.e., sexually useless,
was not a ground, for this, presumably, was curable, and "hopefully"
was to be cured.a
What about conditions and conduct short of impotence? Unwill-
ingness, called a condition or an "act" of refusal, over a long period
with no excuse, might on the premise of strict-duty marriage con-
cepts, be considered mental cruelty. Persistent coldness, refusal or
failure to respond to advances might also be so considered.39 Failure
or refusal to take any initiative might be so considered on the premise
of American male-dominated marriages of fifty years ago when the
young man was rather expected to advance himself. On the other
hand, such aggression may now be accepted or even expected from the
girl. What about a girl brought up to be prim who never overcomes
her psychological taboos against nudity? What about a spouse whose
timidity, even respect, is taken for coldness? What about matters of
frequency? What length of time becomes sexual abandonment?
What about space-separate beds, separate rooms, separate apart-
ments; for a night, for a week, for a summer?
Conditions or Conduct Similar to Bigamy 40
These would be rare, as bigamy itself is rare, and technical. The
statutory ground consists of having had a wife or husband living at the
time of the marriage. What about the case where that first wife or
husband had not yet been divorced, or was not really widowed. What
about Mr. Tutt's case where a charge that defendant married Number
3 while still lawfully married to Number 2 fell short of a valid bigamy
charge-not because defendant was guiltless, but because he was even
more guilty, having gone through the ceremony to Number 2 without
being finally divorced from Number 1!
38. See Lorenz v. Lorenz, supra note 36. Cf. Griffeth v. Griffeth, 162 III. 368,
44 N.E. 820 (1896) and Grosvenor v. Grosvenor, 194 I1. App. 652 (1915)
(divorce for impotence "due" to masturbation, which modern medicine and psychia-
try say does not follow).
39. See Slaight v. Slaight, supra note 27.




Conduct Similar to Adultery41
Except for the rare case of the detective and the flash photograph,
adultery is seldom proved directly in court by a witness who can say
he saw the spouse and the co-respondent together having sexual
relations. Rather the proof lies in circumstantial evidence-a sus-
picion and an inference which we accept or reject according to the
nature of the situation and our wisdom or experience in the ways of
the world.
Now, under the mental cruelty provision, the fact patterns of male-
female human conduct which, with an inference, could lead to di-
vorce for adultery, may be said, without an inference, to warrant
divorce for mental cruelty. Those patterns will doubtless vary now
as before, from the most casual and expected civility to the most gross
and brazen philandering.42 There will doubtless be required an act
and an intent; either alone could probably be explained. The con-
duct in question may be variously interpreted-by the complaining
spouse, by the defending spouse, by concerned third parties, espe-
cially children, by neighbors and friends; but the ultimate interpre-
tation must come from the judge or jury, and perhaps by the appellate
court. Let him who is without comparative fault perhaps cast the
first stone.
Conduct Similar to Statutory Desertion43
The standard case of desertion as such means absence for more
than a year, and "did you give him any ground for leaving?-no."
In default cases, the answers are accepted. In contested cases, they
are not. The separation may be the fault of the one who leaves or the
one who remains. It may be without any agreement, without any
words, and without much real fault-just a sorry and tragic parting
of the ways.44 It may be by violent disagreement, with a bitter dis-
pute and recrimination. It may be with gross fault on both sides.
41. See French v. French, supra note 13; Cash v. Cash, supra note 26.
42. Lascivious philandering may be mental cruelty. See 157 A.L.R. 638
(1945). But mere indiscretion, imprudence, flirting, or affection for another with-
out action may not be mental cruelty. See 157 A.L.R. 641 (1945).
43. See Cash v. Cash, supra note 26; Garvy v. Garvy, supra note 18; Hellrung v.
Hellrung, 321 Ill. App. 333, 53 N.E.2d 10 (1943); Houts v. Houts, 17 Ill. App. 439
(1885); and Ross v. Ross, 109 I11. App. 157 (1903).
44. See Garvy v. Garvy, supra note 18.
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The critical questions are matters of evidence. In separation cases
couched as mental cruelty, the same contentions may be made.
When the separation is less than a year, the time requirement is less
stringent, but the mutual recriminations become more important.4 5
It has been said that to warrant constructive desertion, the cause
of one's leaving must itself be a ground for divorce;46 to constitute
mental cruelty, the cause for one's leaving probably need not be so
grave.47 In an ordinary desertion case, while brief reunion would
not toll or terminate a desertion period, substantial reunion would, and
the ensuing time must "start over" to count toward the requisite
year.48 Such is surely not the case with separations leaving aban-
donment couched as mental cruelty. Indeed, interrupted or separ-
ate periods of absence may be essential to make the offense "re-
peated" as the statute requires.
How long must the separation be, or how short can it be to con-
stitute mental cruelty of the one at fault? Ten months, six, three,
one, three weeks, one week, a week-end, overnight? Could seven
days of absence be considered seven separate, hence repeated of-
fenses?
Conduct Similar to Habitual Drunkenness or Drug Addiction"
Drunkenness, or drug addiction, is usually a voluntary matter.
Even though the offender may loudly protest that the spouse
"drove me to drink," there are many forms of psychological solace,
and most of them are not liquid forms. If the one "driven to it"
happens to "choose booze," it is his doing. Some method of escape
may have been vital, but the alcoholic way was a choice. In drunken-
ness cases, recrimination or contributory fault is given but slight re-
gard. To establish mental cruelty, acts similar to drunkenness or
drug addiction may not have to be for the full two years, nor quite so
45. See Garvy v. Garvy, supra note 18.
46. Fritz v. Fritz, 138 111. 436, 28 N.E. 1058 (1891).
47. See Ross v. Ross, supra note 43, where the spouse claimed she was locked
out of the house; Houts v. Houts, supra note 43, where the parties had to move from
rented rooms.
48. See Albee v. Albee, 141 Ill. 550, 31 N.E. 153 (1892).
49. See Weinberg, supra note 40, at 127; Johnson v. Johnson, supra note 13.
Drug addiction is also a new ground. See Youngs v. Youngs, 130 111. 230, 22 N.E.
806 (1889) (drug addiction does not equal drunkenness). The drug ground was
added in 1967. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1 (1967).
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habitual, nor quite so severe.
Conduct Similar to Attempt to Kill5"
Three elements make up an attempt to kill by means showing
malice: the attempt, the objective, and the means. To make out
mental cruelty based on similar conduct, it may be taken as sufficient
showing that there were mere threats to kill, express or veiled, or mere
talk about it, or the dramatose: "I wish you were dead." The attempt
may be not to kill, but to maim, to wound, to harm, to hurt. The
means may be not malicious, but indifferent, subtle, obtuse, pig-
headed.
What about a fourth element. Need not the grounds be an attempt
(or as mental cruelty a threat) to kill the spouse? What about an
attempt to kill oneself? How better could it be shown that I am an
unfit spouse than that my spouse took her life-she was that miser-
able? How could she cut me more deeply than to threaten suicide?
"Oh, I can't live with you. . . . I wish I were dead." This may be
the tragic lament of a hopeless situation reflective of the viciousness
of the defendant complained of; but it just might be wholly un-
warranted,51 wholly unfair, and a bitterly cruel slander of an innocent
spouse who is devoted, diligent, and made desolate by the charge.
Conduct Similar to Physical Cruelty52
In a standard cruelty case, the acts must be "extreme" and "re-
peated," and obviously must be harmful to the other spouse. 53 The
shoddy proof bordering on perjury that has made sophists of lawyers
and cynics of judges lies mainly in this field. Without cross-examina-
tion, the slightest contact can be called a blow, the slightest twinge
can be called pain, and two times triviality makes cruelty.
50. "Diligent research has failed to unearth any case in the Illinois reports
wherein a divorce was granted on this ground." WEINBERG, supra note 40, at 138.
See also Alanen v. Alanen, 84 Ill. App. 2d 53, 228 N.E.2d 492 (1967).
51. Cf. Goldstine v. Goldstine, supra note 26.
52. See WEINBERG, supra note 40. See Johnson v. Johnson, supra note 13;
Henderson v. Henderson, supra note 17; Mason v. Mason, supra note 18; and
Alanen v. Alanen, supra note 50; Hellrung v. Hellrung, supra note 43 (pushing);
and Lemanski v. Lemanski, 87 Ill. App. 2d 405, 231 N.E.2d 191 (1967) (knocking
the complainant against a dresser or wall).
53. "Bruises, cuts, limping, and the like are not usually the result of slight acts
of cruelty . . . . [Tihey may aid a trial judge to find that the acts of violence
were acts of cruelty within the statute ....... Alanen v. Alanen, supra note 50,
at 57, 228 N.E.2d at 494, quoting Stockman v. Stockman, 38 Il. App. 2d 186, 189,
186 N.E.2d 547, 549 (1962).
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The same conduct couched as mental cruelty may indeed be that.
A hand raised in anger but never struck can be just as frightening,
just as devastating as when it strikes. In most cases, psychologically
the harm is done when it is raised, and the blow is an anti-climax.
There is a crucial difference! Physical hurts can be cured with a
salve; psychological harm may be permanent.
Conduct Similar to Felony 4
Conviction of a felony is a technical matter, involving a fact shown
simply by court records, and raising questions only of law as to
whether the offense was a common law or statutory item in the
felony category. Compared with a burglary or grand theft, many of-
fenses not constituting state felonies may be most offensive to the
spouse. They include some state misdemeanors, statutory breaches,
quasi-crimes, municipal or county ordinance violations, federal mat-
ters, offenses under military law.
Consider the following: a shameful and cowardly departure from
the scene of an accident; poaching or taking innocent game out of
season; littering or dumping trash or burning leaves illegally; voting
twice; soliciting bribes; breaking building lines; burning a draft card;
spitting on the flag; cheating on income tax or going absent without
leave.
Conduct Similar to Injecting with a Venereal Disease"
Giving the other spouse a venereal disease is a specific and very
rare case. Assuming one can refrain from communicative contacts,
mental cruelty might be claimed by far less than giving a venereal
disease: e.g., by giving the other spouse leprosy, scarlet fever,
measles, a bad cold. Or trying to, or failure to guard against com-
municating the disease. What about simply acquiring a venereal
disease-whether it is communicated to the spouse or not, whether
contacts are made in indifference to the chance of communication or
54. See Getz v. Getz, 332 Ill. App. 364 (1947), court martial conviction for
desertion held not conviction of a felony or other infamous crime, even in time of
war.
55. "Diligent research has failed to unearth any case in the Illinois reports
wherein a divorce was granted on this ground." WEINBERG, supra note 40, at 157.
See Williams v. Williams, 77 I11. App. 229 (1897) (defendant's syphilis justifies
wife's refusal of relations in separate maintenance suit).
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not, whether the spouse even knows of it or not. What about telling
the other that one has a venereal disease? What about telling the
other falsely that one has such a disease?
MISCELLANEOUS CASES
The listings of divorce grounds found in standard texts fairly cover
the categories, if not the instances. They actually add very little to
the catalogue of possibilities covered in the foregoing discussion of
conduct similar to or short of Illinois statutory grounds; and even as
specifics, they are helter-skelter. They should be listed, however, if
only to indicate what other state legislatures have seen fit to specify.
Excluding items obviously already covered above, the specifics in-
clude these:" violence; indignities; joining a religious order which
disbelieves in marriage; incompatibility; gross misbehavior or wicked-
ness; wife being a prostitute; husband being a vagrant; insanity,
incurable, for a certain length of time; crime against nature.
Other cases of conduct which might be held to constitute mental
cruelty will doubtless include a broad range of matters. Illinois
domestic relations cases afford a good sample: words which are
rude, vulgar, profane or obscene; words expressing the defendant's
dissatisfaction with the plaintiff or indicating that the defendant no
longer loves the plaintiff, or contemplates getting a divorce; words
charging the other unjustly with unchastity or infidelity; or words
that are generally cruel and abusive;17 poor housekeeping;58 locking
the other spouse out of the house; 9 query, as to a breakdown of
communications and mutual endearment; or "incompatibility;"6 °
56. WORLD ALMANAC 761 (1969).
57. See Johnson, supra note 13; Vignos, supra note 22; Schoop, supra note 26;
Harris, supra note 28; Ross, supra note 43; and Hansen v. Hansen, 2 II1. C.C. 22,
6 N.E. 333 (1885) (all indicating rude or obscene words); French, supra note 13;
Goldstine, supra note 26; and Cash, supra note 26 (all indicating refutations of
love); Johnson, supra note 13; Schoop, supra note 26; Schriner, supra note 26; and
Annot., 72 A.L.R.2d 1197 (1959) (all indicating words charging unchastity); and
French, supra note 13; Johnson, supra note 13; Vignos, supra note 22; Goldstine,
supra note 26; Harris, supra note 28; and Miller v. Miller, 333 Ill. App. 642, 78
N.E.2d 131 (1948) (all indicating words of general abuse).
58. See Hunter v. Hunter, 121 Ill. App. 380 (1905).
59. See Ross v. Ross, supra note 43.
60. See Johnson, supra note 13; French, supra note 13; Cash, supra note 26;
Garvy, supra note 18; Slaight, supra note 27; and Haste v. Haste, 1 Ill. App. 2d 417,
117 N.E.2d 789 (1953). Expressions in these cases may indicate that "incompat-
ability" is not enough to establish a ground for divorce in Illinois, though couched as
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failure or refusal of sexual activity, or infrequency thereof; 1 dissatis-
faction with married life (A sues B, charging that B's conduct has
been such that A is dissatisfied; distinguished from A sues B, charg-
ing that B was cruel by declaring B is dissatisfied);62 loss of economic
benefit or opportunity;" stinginess, such as cutting off, or threat-
ening to cut off credit or means of supplying family necessaries;"4
mistreatment of children dear to the other spouse, or taking children
away from the care or company of the other spouse;" bringing, in-
viting or permitting in the family household in-laws who interfere,
meddle or dominate household affairs, or inducing near family mem-
bers to do violence to the spouse."
This is but a sampling of miscellaneous offensive conduct be-
tween spouses. Whether any or all of the sample items will be con-
sidered as instances of mental cruelty under the new Illinois law re-
mains to be seen. Until then, it must be kept in mind that these are
not precedents but only analogies, that facts mean more than
opinions, and that dicta may be delusive.
Realizing that the varieties of human conduct are infinite, one may
be inclined to discard the specifics of single instance samples for the
more eclectic approach of a formula. Such an approach has been
attempted in the Third Circuit of Illinois. The formula used there,
by way of suggestion only, is that conduct claimed to constitute
mental cruelty ought to be presented in three aspects: 1) some
action or omission of the defendant; 2) relating to subject matter
involved in the marriage relationship; and 3) having a harmful or
deleterious effect on the plaintiff.
The defendant's action might be committed against the person or
property of the plaintiff, or against other persons or property (e.g.,
mental cruelty. Cf. Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1218 (1958). Cash refers to a breakdown
of communications and mutual endearment, but the language is dictum. Garvy refers
to mutual incompatibility; divorce for the husband and separate maintenance for
the wife were both denied.
61. See Slaight v. Slaight, supra note 27.
62. See Jackman v. Jackman, 218 III. App. 329 (1919).
63. Id.
64. See French, supra note 13; Schoop, supra note 26; Goldstine, supra note 26;
Harris, supra note 28; Ross, supra note 43.
65. See Levy v. Levy, supra note 17; See Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 1361 (1962)
(mistreatment of children); 82 A.L.R.2d 1382 (1962) (taking children away).




that of the children). It might be a neglect or refusal or failure or
omission as well as an affirmative physical act. It could be an
aggravation.
The subject matter could involve such mundane matters as: living
arrangements (eating, sleeping, bathing, hobbies, entertainment);
caring for the household (paying bills, household maintenance, cook-
ing, cleaning, laundry, heating); work (cooperation or interference);
money, appearance and neatness, relations, friends, children, edu-
cation, recreation, property, or social status.
The effect on the plaintiff, in order to constitute ground for di-
vorce, ought to reach the state of some physical illness, some mental
illness or disturbance, nervousness, overwork, loss of money, loss
of employment, loss of affection, and so on. A proper combination
of defendant's conduct in regard to a marital matter with harm to the
plaintiff could, if extreme and repeated, constitute mental cruelty
and ground for divorce.
On the other hand, it is likely that matters of mere attitude, mood,
taste, appearance, style, or eccentricity would not rise to the level of
such mental cruelty, especially if they were trivial, not directly af-
fecting the spouse, nor adversely affecting the spouse, merely con-
trary to the spouse's taste, or if they were superficial, spurious or
feigned.
Another formula approach lists these factors: 1) the type of be-
havior of the defendant; 2) the defendant's intent; 3) the degree of
the conduct; 4) its duration; 5) its effect on the plaintiff; 6) its ef-
fect on their home life; and 7) the prospects of reconciliation.6 7
PANDORA'S BOX: AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Charges against a defendant in a divorce case can be denied,
which is the standard negative defense: "I didn't do it." Or they
can be admitted, and met with one of several affirmative defenses,
which on various theories make the charges unavailing for the com-
plaining party. These affirmative defenses may be shortly sum-
marized as follows:
67. Bundesen, supra note 4, at 237. A point system has also been suggested,
such as that used for driver's license offenses; e.g., a black eye could mean 10
points; a vulgarism 5; out all night 15; insults to mother-in-law 3; and when you
get so many points, you get your divorce.
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DEFENSE INVOLVING THE ACT CHARGED
This might be a justification or excuse, usually some form of
provocation 68 by the plaintiff, precipitating the defendant's conduct.
It might be some participation by the plaintiff in the incident itself-
connivance, 9 or contributory fault. These involve conduct by the
plaintiff. Or the defense might vitiate the legal effect of the defend-
ant's act, by the plaintiff's condonation,7°0not conduct of the plain-
tiff, but forgiveness by the plaintiff.
DEFENSE INVOLVING SOME OTHER INCIDENT
A frequent defense is recrimination,7' conduct of the plaintiff in-
volving a degree of fault equal to the defendant's, and neutralizing that
fault as a ground for divorce. Like provocation, it may occur before
and justify or excuse the defendant's fault; but it may occur after the
defendant's fault, in an entirely different incident or set of circum-
stances, and rather than justify or excuse the defendant's fault,
simply disqualify the plaintiff from utilizing the defendant's fault as
a ground for divorce.
DEFENSE INVOLVING THE PROCEEDINGS
The most frequent bar in the proceedings is collusion, 72 usually not
a defense presented by the party charged at all, but something dis-
covered and raised by the court in support of public policy or the
court's integrity. Related but rare are the matters of insincerity, and
ambivalence.
These defenses are relevant to our discussion of mental cruelty
for only one reason, but a very important one-what they imply in
the construction and applications of that term. 73  Those implications
68. KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 573 (3d ed. 1946); Garrett v. Garrett, 252
Il. 318, 96 N.E. 882 (1911).
69. KEEZER, supra note 68, at 550; BuRIY, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 44 (1960);
Reisen v. Reisen, 148 I11. App. 460 (1909); Eames v. Eames, 133 11. App. 665
(1907).
70. KEEZER, supra note 68, at 553; BURBY, supra note 69, at 45; WEINBERG, supra
note 40, at 141; Hunt v. Hunt, 211 Ill. App. 410 (1918).
71. KEEZER, supra note 68, at 563; WEINBERG, supra note 41, at 151; BURBY,
supra note 70, at 46; Garrett v. Garrett, supra note 69.
72. KEEZER, supra note 69, at 546; WEINBERG, supra note 40, at 147; BuRBY,
supra note 69, at 44; Borin v. Borin, 335 Ill. App. 450, 82 N.E.2d 70 (1948).
73. The defenses have been extensively criticized along lines summarized in
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shall now be examined.
Apart from defenses and counterclaims, a loose attitude toward
mental cruelty, or to the whole proposition of divorce may very well
mean that "anyone can get a divorce" on that ground; that is, the
charge can be made to stick on very little or very dubious evidence.
But suppose that to a complaint charging mental cruelty, there is
filed a counterclaim charging the counterdefendant also with men-
tal cruelty. In all fairness, the elements of the offense, the nature of
the evidence, or the quantum of proof required for the counterclaim
should be no greater than that required for the complaint.
Now suppose instead of counterclaiming for divorce on the plain-
tiff's mental cruelty, the defendant defends against divorce, claiming
recrimination on the basis of the plaintiff's own mental cruelty.
Again, in all fairness, since each party has the same charge, the nature
of the evidence and the quantum of proof should still be the same.
Going further, suppose the defendant's affirmative defense is not
full-scale recrimination but merely provocation. The defendant says
yes, I was mentally cruel, but she drove me to it. Before 1967 and
even today it has taken substantial elements, grave evidence and
clear proof for the plaintiff to show physical cruelty,74 and therefore
substantial elements, grave evidence and clear proof for the de-
BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO 237 (1962): "Standing in the way of a genuine in-
quiry are not only the divorce court judge's lack of time and staff but also certain
antiquated legal doctrines. Originally erected as safeguards against easy divorce,
these 'defenses' are rooted in the premise that divorce is an adversary proceeding in
which an 'innocent' party attempts to prove his mate 'guilty' of certain sins for
which divorce is the proper punishment. Under this concept, when both parties are
substantially at fault, no divorce can be granted. Yet this doctrine of 'recrimination'
is patently unrealistic. In most unhappy marriages, husband and wife have both
fallen short of perfection. Reconciliation can be achieved only if both recognize
their faults and make a cooperative effort to repair the union. If such a recon-
ciliation cannot be achieved, a rational divorce procedure would dissolve the union
without attempting to brand one party innocent and the other guilty. Equally
troublesome is the doctrine of 'condonation.' If the 'innocent' party continues to
live--or sleep-with the 'guilty' party after he becomes aware of the latter's wrong
behavior, this bars divorce. A more ingenious way of discouraging reconciliation
could scarcely be devised. If a marriage counselor persuades a separated couple
that they should try living together again, they may find it difficult to establish
grounds for divorce in case the reconciliation fails. Similarly unrealistic is the doc-
trine that divorce must be refused if there is evidence of 'collusion' between the
parties. This principle hampers realistic marriage counseling by preserving the fic-
tion that parties contemplating divorce can safely deal with each other only at arms'
length."
74. Henderson v. Henderson, supra note 17; Alanen v. Alanen, supra note 50.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
fendant to show provocation.75  Now, if it takes "different" (lesser?)
evidence for the plaintiff to show mental cruelty, it should there-
fore take "different" (lesser?) evidence for the defendant to show
provocation. More simply, if, prior to the addition of the mental
cruelty provision, requirements to support a charge of physical
cruelty were strictly construed, with the same strict construction being
applied to the defense of provocation, then it would follow that if it
now takes slight evidence to show mental cruelty, it should require no
more than slight evidence to defend against a charge of mental cruelty
by a counter-charge of provocation.
A similar situation would prevail with connivance, contributory
fault or condonation. If it takes only slight evidence to show the
defendant's mental cruelty, it should take only slight evidence to
show plaintiffs connivance or contributory fault. And if mental
cruelty may be a matter of some few words, so with some few words
it can be forgiven, condoned and lost as a ground for divorce. In
sum, if "nit-picking" has become a ground for divorce, so "nit-pick-
ing" may be a defense. Instead of opening wide the doors of di-
vorce, we have slammed them shut.
If at this point we return to the fundamental questions about
public morals and the position of the court, it is a problem involving
the court itself. Thus, as the elements of the requisite charges or the
nature of the evidence become "easier," the question as to whether a
defense could be raised becomes more acute. With "stricter," more
traditional grounds, defenses are raised in contested matters. Could
they not be raised in default cases? Should they not be? If, as
grounds are "easier," defenses are also "easier," is the court's duty
to recognize or suggest defenses not more obvious? Or should the
court view the existence of the new ground as a legislative mandate
for the court to close its eyes?76
One answer may be that the legislature has not given the courts
any mandate to close their eyes, and that it is not, or should not, be
any "easier" to prove mental cruelty than to prove physical cruelty.
75. Wesselhoeft v. Wesselhoeft, 369 11. 419, 17 N.E.2d 56 (1938).
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 9(a) (1967) adopted in the same session of the
legislature as the "mental cruelty" amendment, provides: "the fault or conduct of
the plaintiff, unless raised by the pleadings, is not a bar to the action nor a proper
basis for the refusal of a decree of divorce." If there were a mandate for the court
to close its eyes, it would be under this limitation on the recrimination defense, not
under the "mental cruelty" amendment.
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The Henderson case, requiring since 1878 that physical cruelty be
"extreme," and the Alanen case, reasserting that principle by way of
dictum as late as 1967, are still the law: not every physical contact
is cruelty. The statute still says "extreme and repeated" physical
cruelty, and the case law is in accord.77 The statute applies the same
adjectives to both types of conduct: "extreme and repeated physical
or mental cruelty." The case law should be the same. If this is so,
it is not "easier" to prove the charge, and therefore it should not be
considered easier to prove an affirmative defense. The question
should not arise.7 8
Technically, the new ground may open up or invite some very
nice questions of comparative fault. In the field of tort law on
negligence, contributory fault of the plaintiff, though minimal, bars
the plaintiff completely from securing a liability judgment against the
defendant, despite the defendant's fault and even though his fault is
greater, so long as the fault of each party is of the same nature; i.e.,
negligence against negligence. This traditional position has recently
been reaffirmed; a comparative fault concept, apportioning loss by
the same ratio as the fault was apportioned, has been specifically
rejected. 7  Likewise, dividing liability more or less equally by the
number of responsible parties has long been rejected: "no contrib-
ution among joint tort feasors."' 0 Only in the field of indemnity
has there been a recognition of and a relief according to comparative
fault-and this with a rather bland oblivion toward the traditional
rule between plaintiff and defendant or among co-defendants, of con-
tributory bar and non-contribution.8'
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1 (1967); Henderson, supra note 17; Alanen, supra
note 50, Collinet, supra note 16.
78. The problem assumes an affirmative defense pleaded, so the statute limit-
ing the recrimination defense does not apply.
79. Maki v. Frelk, 40 II. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968), rev'g 85 Ill. App.
2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 294 (1967).
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 § 25(2) (1965); Muhlbauer v. Kruzel, 39 I11. 2d
226, 234 N.E.2d 790 (1968).
81. Indemnity relief was granted on what may be considered a comparative
fault basis in Reynolds v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 51 11. App. 2d 334, 201 N.E.2d 322
(1964); Campbell v. Joslyn, 65 11. App. 2d 44, 212 N.E.2d 699 (1965); Trzos v.
Berman, 86 Ill. App. 2d 176, 229 N.E.2d 787 (1967); and Miller v. DeWitt, 37
Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967). It was denied in: Shulman v. Chrysler, 31
Ill. App. 2d 168 (1961); Drell v. Am. Natl. Bank, 57 Ill. App. 2d 129 (1965);
Chicago & Ill. Midland Ry. v. Evans Constr. Co., 32 Ill. 2d 600, 208 N.E.2d 573
(1965); Spivack v. O'Hara, 69 111. App. 2d 22, 216 N.E.2d 173 (1966); Stewart v.
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Consider raising such questions in regard to mental cruelty.
Should recrimination by way of the plaintiff's mental cruelty bar the
plaintiff from divorce? Should it bar separate maintenance? Should
it bar child support? If mental cruelty by the defendant makes life
for P and D together unendurable, should mental cruelty by both
P and D not make it doubly unendurable, or impossible?8" Yet
the law of recrimination ends the unendurable marriage, but perpet-
uates the one doubly unendurable.8" When both are guilty of mental
cruelty, should the law permit a divorce "for" the one least at fault? 4
If so, should it reward the one least at fault and punish the one
more at fault by adjusting alimony, support, property, or child-
custody time? Or if both parties are equally at fault, both mentally
cruel to one another, so that the marriage is doubly unendurable,
why condemn the children to such a household? While the parents
may despise each other, each may love the child, so that it might be
far better for the child to be with one of them alone than with both,
or with foster-parents. Should the fault of each bar the other from
relief, or, if so, should it bar relief for the "family" unit including the
children? Could not divorce for both, or a separation, be granted,
thereby rendering life more bearable for parents and children alike?
Considering the potential for confusion in the areas of comparative
fault and ease of proof in regard to mental cruelty, we have used the
wrong figure. It is not a matter simply of opening wide or slamming
shut the doors -it is a matter of opening Pandora's box.
PERSPECTIVE: INTERDISCIPLINARY HINTS
Sociologically, any discussion of divorce will develop into a dis-
cussion concerning marriage, and properly so. This paper has given
Dudley, 75 I11. App. 2d 328, 221 N.E.2d I1 (1966); and Muhlbauer v. Kruzel, 78
III. App. 2d 343, 223 N.E.2d 227 (1966), alf'd 39 II1. 2d 226, 234 N.E.2d 790(1968).
82. "The policy of the State that permits divorce when one spouse has been
guilty of designated misconduct is often doubly present when both parties have been
guilty. The disruption of the family relationship is certainly more pronounced."
BURBY, supra note 69, at 47, citing Pavlevitch v. Pavlevitch, 50 N.M. 224, 174 P.2d
826 (1946).
83. Elston v. Elston, 344 111. App. 233, 100 N.E.2d 635 (1951); Levy v. Levy,
supra note 17. DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952), would
permit divorce granted to both parties. See BURBY, supra note 69 at 47.
84. This is suggested by BURBY, supra note 69 at 47.
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the new statutory ground a somewhat standard consideration, based
on the traditional legal-judicial approaches, and has shown that they
may be obsolete and self-contradictory, leaving perplexing problems.
We have also observed that the concepts may in some cases seem
hollow or ridiculous. The question of divorce may have been re-
duced to a matter of how much pain a person can take, or should be
asked to take, before the state, the law and the judge step in. Mar-
riage has been considered as a sacrament, as a contract, as a social
institution and as a relationship. This paper has not considered it
as a medium for individual growth and satisfaction. We have not
seen what the psychologists may see: devotion as sometimes the
most subtle kind of dominance, the most insidious mental cruelty,
or abstinence from complaint as the most bitter recrimination. The
question of divorce has been considered paramount, whereas the
pressing question is the question of marriage .8  As any good psy-
chiatrist would observe, this paper has viewed man and woman only as
they appear in law offices and courts-not as they really are. Law-
yers and, sometimes, judges deal not in reality, but in gloss, super-
ficiality and myth. 6
And if we suggest the potentials of corruption inherent in a pos-
sible manipulation of so important an institution as marriage through
so flexible a concept as mental cruelty, the historian may suggest
that this is nothing new. Chicago in the forties was in the throes of
legalistic turmoil leading up to the successive "cooling off" laws,
earnestly presented as needed to preserve the family.87  Chicago one
85. For an illuminating historical perspective on this whole matter, see BLAKE,
THE ROAD TO RENO, supra note 74. At p. 29, he recites the famous words "What
therefore God hath joined, let no man put asunder," and quotes Milton's consid-
eration in Tetrachordon: "Shall we say that God hath joined error, fraud, unfit-
ness, wrath, contention, perpetual loneliness, perpetual discord; whatever lust, or
wine or witchery, threat or incitement, avarice or ambition hath joined together,
faithful and unfaithful, Christian with anti-christian, hate with hate, or hate with
love; shall we say this is God's joining?"
86. BLAKE, supra note 74, at 99, quotes Mrs. Elizabeth Stanton, a pioneer woman
advocate of divorce law reform: "The wisest possible reform we could have on
this whole question is to have no legislation whatever. The relations of the sexes
are too delicate in their nature for statutes, lawyers, judges, jurors, or our public
journals to take cognizance of, or regulate." For many varied insights on the
marriage relationship, see DEBEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (1953); FRIEDAN, THE
FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963); and ROBINSON, THE POWER OF SEXUAL SURRENDER
(1959).
87. VIRTUE, FAMILY CASES IN COURT, 52-112 (1956).
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hundred years ago was a "divorce mill" for the correspondence cases
from New York."' New York, with the self-deluding purism of adul-
tery as the sole ground for divorce, had been and is a fake forum,
using fraud and fiction to avoid its own rigors and utilizing annul-
ment in lieu of divorce as freely as in the middle ages."' Nothing
really appears to be new.'"
CONCLUSION: A MATTER OF JUDGMENT
We still have many pressures-from the press, the church, our own
feelings and faith, family and society, and all the viewpoints of our
background-tested now in all the conflict of the times. Yet these
may be as unreliable as the new trends. We may have the ease of
doing nothing to change, but this is not the assurance of knowing we
are right.
What we lack is authority. The church, even in its stricter sects,
does not provide it. A non-authoritarian state likewise does not pro-
vide it. The legislature gives a ground but not a definition. Social
viewpoint is not only noncompulsive, but highly diverse. New free-
dom is beneficial, as is diversity. But understanding and reason
are essential. "If there were no God," said the skeptic Voltaire, "It
would be necessary to invent one." If there is no natural law, it may
be useful to devise some. But along what principles?
We also lack precedent. 1  What comes to us will be slow. It
will be on single instances-thus varied and uncertain as a general
guide. Trial court cases will be decided on the basis of credibility
88. BLAKE, supra note 74, at 116-19.
89. BLAKE, supra note 74, at 116-19.
90. BLAKE, supra note 74, at 17: "Around 1100, St. Anselm was grieved to hear
that in Ireland men exchanged wives 'as publicly and freely as horses.' Some
ninety years later Petrus Cantor of the University of Paris lamented that 'for
money's sake, at our own choice, we clergy join or separate whom we will.'
In England the unknown author of the poem Piers Plowman wrote bitterly that a
man could get rid of his wife by giving the judge a fur coat."
91. Even the highest guides on critical issues are not always reliable. See the
variance in: Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 629 (1906); Williams v. North Caro-
lina, 317 U.S. 269 (1942); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Sher-
rer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 278 (1948); and Estin v.
Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). In Estin, id. at 554, Mr. Justice Jackson epitomized the
confusion in his dissent: "The Court reaches the Solomon-like conclusion that the
Nevada decree is half good and half bad under the full faith and credit clause. It is
good to free the husband from the marriage; it is not good to free him from its
incidental obligations."
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of witnesses; and, once the facts are determined, they may be so
varied that they may not fit into the limited patterns of the prece-
dents we now have.
What is wanted is judgment, for judges especially, and also for
lawyers, lawmakers, and the public. Judgment is always a worthy
goal, and now in this field it is a vital one. This paper is offered to
aid in an approach to that goal.
